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ECONOMIC RESILIENCE AND MARKET 
EFFICIENCY IN SMALL STATES 
Gordon Cordina 
Abstract. Economic resilience is the ability of an economy to 
withstand and rebound from the effects of adverse shocks. This 
is dependent upon the efficiency with which resources are 
allocated and can be reallocated following changes in exogenous 
conditions. Markets are a key factor in the allocation of resources, 
be they capital, labour, goods and services. Therefore, the extent 
to which markets operate efficiently is an important determinant 
of economic resilience. On the other hand, it is to be considered 
that instances of market failure are more common in small, 
vulnerable economies, which consequently have greater need for 
policy measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency of markets or 
at replacing them with appropriate mechanisms conducive 
towards building economic resilience. In this context, it is 
important to avoid instances of policy failure, which may 
nevertheless apply to a larger extent in small economies. 
1. Introduction 
There is an established body of literature exploring the special 
characteristics of small economies and their implications for economic 
behaviour and development which can be traced back to at least 1960 
(Robinson, 1960; Kuznets, 1960). The principal defining characteristics, 
often viewed as handicaps, of small economies, include a high 
dependence on international trade, highly concentrated exports and 
imports due to limited diversification possibilities, a proneness towards 
current account deficits, a relatively large public sector within the 
economy and variability in output growth (Briguglio, 1995; Cordina, 
2006). The recent wave of globlisation brought a fresh set of challenges 
for small states, as reviewed in a Commonwealth Secretariat and World 
Bank (2000) study, updated by Briguglio, Stern and Persaud (2006). 
On the other hand, from an empirical perspective, it appears that the 
special characteristics of small economies do not impinge on their average 
levels of per-capita income but rather on the dispersion of their income 
levels from a cross-sectional perspective as well as over time (Cordina, 
2006). These observations may be interpreted in terms of the fact that 
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small economies, especially if insular, tend to face higher levels of risks 
to their economic growth and development, engendered by their 
exposure to shocks. This phenomenon was studied by Briguglio (1995), 
who initiated the measurement of economic vulnerability with special 
reference to small and island economies. 
The different degrees of success achieved by small states have more 
recently been analysed and associated with policy-induced, or nurtured, 
resilience factors which allow countries to absorb, withstand and 
rebound from the effects of negative shocks (Briguglio et al., 2006). Thus, 
economic growth and development of small states essentially hinges on 
the extent to which such states are vulnerable to adverse exogenous 
shocks and on the presence or otherwise of nurtured resilience to 
withstand such shocks. 
Briguglio et al. (2006) identify four principal determinants of economic 
resilience namely macroeconomic stability, microeconomic market 
efficiency, good governance and social development. In the context of 
microeconomic market efficiency, it is argued that the existence of rapidly 
adjusting markets which efficiently allocate and reallocate resources in 
the wake of exogenous shocks is conducive to economic resilience. In 
this respect, Downes (2006) notes that market-oriented reforms in small 
economies are not necessarily successful in promoting resilience, due to 
the absence of sufficiently thick and deep market structures and a lack 
of institutional capacity. 
This chapter presents a conceptual framework aimed at highlighting 
the importance of market efficiency for economic resilience building. It 
proceeds to show that the conditions for market efficiency are often 
insufficient in small states, where the types of market failure are different 
and more pervasive than those found in larger economies. Consequently, 
there is a case for policy intervention in small states with an aim of 
enhancing the resource allocation mechanism. Government intervention 
in this regard is however also beset by the possibility of failure. 
Furthermore, instances of policy failure are also likely to be more marked 
in small economies. This emphasises the need for proper governance 
structures in small states, possibly amplified and improved through 
supranational and regional arrangements. 
2. Economic Resilience and Market Efficiency 
Briguglio et al. (2006) define economic resilience as being policy induced 
and as having two dimensions namely the ability to withstand shocks 
and the ability to recover quickly from the effects of adverse shocks. 
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Policy measures in this regard are aimed at neutralizing the effects of an 
economy's inherent vulnerability, that is, exposure to exogenous shocks 
that fall outside the control of the economy. 
Cordina (2004) explains the need for resilience in terms of the asymmetric 
effects of shocks to which an economy may be exposed. Typically the 
effects of negative shocks would outweigh those of positive ones. This 
may be ascribed to diminishing marginal productivity of resources, 
entailing that a negative shock to an economy's resources would have 
stronger effects on output than an equivalent positive shock. Small 
economies may suffer from a double disadvantage in this respect. Not 
only are they inherently more exposed to shocks, but they may also be 
prone to a stronger rate of diminishing marginal productivity. This may 
take place as such economies are unable to reap economies of scale and 
of scope, due to size limitations. Furthermore, certain positive 
externalities on production, such as those emanating from good 
governance and research and development, would tend to have limited 
effect, or would come at a relatively high cost per unit of output, due to 
the fixed costs involved in the generation of such external effects. 
Conceptually therefore, the issue of resilience building may be viewed 
as the implen1entation of measures that would retard, as much as 
possible, the onset of diminishing marginal productivity of resources. 
For this to take place, it is essential that resources are allocated as 
efficiently as possible, and are quickly reallocated to their best possible 
uses following exogenous shocks. If resources are in the first place 
efficiently allocated and the economy enjoys competitive advantages, 
the effects of adverse shocks can be mitigated. This would likewise take 
place if an economy can quickly reallocate its resources to their most 
productive and profitable uses following shocks to market conditions. 
Two conditions are required for this to take place. Firstly, the price 
mechanism would have to operate properly such that prices would reflect 
the true cost of resources involved in production and of the benefits that 
society would reap from such production. For this to take place, there has 
to be, amongst other things, a sufficiently high number of buyers and 
sellers such that prices are not distorted through monopolistic and 
monopsonistic practices, and absence of externalities in production and 
consumption. Furthermore, information about prices is to be available 
freely and symmetrically to all economic agents. Secondly, there needs to 
be flexibility in the economy which would allow goods, services, labour 
and capital to respond to the price signals in the economy, thereby finding 
their welfare-optimising utilisation. These notions are based on standard 
neoclassical theory that suggests that the market mechanism yields static 
allocative efficiency gains and optimal weltare outcomes. 
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An example of how the functioning of markets may influence economic 
resilience may illustrate the point better. Consider the economy of Malta, 
where tourism generates an estimated 10 percent of GDP. As happened 
in other economies, activity in the tourism sector in Malta was adversely 
hit by the effects of the September 2001 terrorist attacks. This had ripple 
effects on the rest of the economy and tourism activity has been severely 
affected, and it was only in 2007 that it showed some signs of incipient 
growth as government started to subsidise low-cost airlines. The lack of 
resilience in the tourism sector may be at least in part ascribed to 
microeconomic market inefficiency. One such source of inefficiency in 
Malta originates out of the market for land, where prices are high, and 
increasing, in spite of an apparent excess supply of residences, as they 
are sustained by speculative pressures. 
Another example can be found in the reaction to the increase in 
international oil prices. Like many other small economies, Malta is 
completely dependent on oil imports for its energy. An increase in the 
international prices of imports have a marked effect on economic and 
social activity. Domestic energy prices in Malta had been subsidised for 
a long time and when the subsidised prices could no longer be 
maintained, the consequent shock on the economy was magnified. The 
economy would have probably managed the shock much better had it 
been exposed to fair market conditions with fluctuating international 
prices. This could have led to a lower increase in domestic oil prices 
within an economy that was already geared to face movements in the 
price of energy. 
On the other hand, the Maltese economy, like others such as Cyprus 
and Singapore, shows remarkable resilience in economic activities that 
are mainly market-driven. The liberalisation of external trade consequent 
upon EU membership entailed virtually no losses in jobs as inefficient 
sectors were forced to restructure or close down to make space for more 
efficient setups, also thanks to a well-trained and flexible labour force. 
Market forces are also allowing the slack in economic activity being 
generated by a secular decline in manufacturing to be taken up by 
services activities, mostly in the areas of IT and finance. 
Loayza and Soto (2003) identify two key elements in the proper 
functioning of markets namely, the private participation and the 
existence of competition among private agents. This implies that 
government intervention in economic activity should be limited in depth 
and scope. Public policy could however occupy a central role in 
establishing the conditions for the proper operation of markets. Posner 
(1998) emphasises the need for an environment in which legal rights, 
especially property and contractual rights, are enforced and protected. 
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Klein and Hadjimichael (2003) highlight the need to ensure proper access 
to markets and private sector development through, for instance, 
competition policy, prudential regulation and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. The public sector would also occupy a central role in 
the investment in public goods and building institutional capacity (World 
Bank, 2002). 
The above conditions can therefore be construed as being central to the 
development of economic resilience based on properly functioning 
market mechanisms. 
3. Market Failures 
The fact that markets may fail to operate properly is well known in 
economics. This would entail that markets, if left to operate freely, would 
not generate desirable results, most notably failing in achieving allocative 
efficiency and welfare optimisation (Zerbe and McCurdy, 1999). The 
situations where markets would fail to operate properly include 
monopolistic production, the presence of externalities, sluggish market 
adjustment, missing markets, asymmetric information, uncertainty and 
socially undesirable distributive outcomes. 
Monopolistic market situations often result out of the presence of 
economies of scale, engendered by high fixed costs in production. In 
monopolistic situations where producers have power over the market, 
prices do not accurately reflect resource costs and social benefits, thereby 
resulting in limited production at high prices, and an economically sub-
optimal outcome. The obverse of this is a situation of monopsony, where 
the existence of buyers with strong market power would distort prices 
from properly exercising their function within an economy. 
Externalities entail cost and welfare effects that cannot be incorporated 
within market prices. These effects are termed to be of a social nature, 
with consequences that go beyond the individual producer or consumer 
who would pay or receive a price in a market. In the case of consumption, 
externalities arise in the presence of non-rival and non-excludable goods, 
where benefits and costs cam10t be restricted to the consumer who is 
actually paying for the commodity. In the case of production, externalities 
arise out of improperly defined property rights over the consequences 
of production from the utilisation of a resource. In the presence of 
externalities, market prices, which reflect costs and benefits as perceived 
by individual consumers and producers, would not indicate the costs 
and benefits as pertaining to society as a whole. Examples of this would 
include environmental pollution from productive activities, and on the 
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positive side, spillover effects to other productive sectors from the creation 
of knowledge or the adoption of new technologies in any one sector. In 
the presence of externalities, markets would result in a sub-optimal 
allocation of resources, with excessive production of goods entailing social 
costs, and insufficient output of goods providing social benefits. 
Situations of sluggish market adjustment would entail lack of flexibility 
in the mobility of resources so that the price signal, although present, 
would not result in a timely optimal allocation of resources. This would 
take place in situations where the production of a commodity or resource 
would take a significant amount of time, such as in the development of 
human capital. It could also entail lack of mobility of resources due to 
geographical, cultural or social frictions. An example of this could be 
the cultural norms on land ownership in certain societies, where 
restrictions on transfers would result in a sluggish process for the 
resource to find its most productive allocation. 
Situations of missing markets arise in the case where a demand for a 
product or service cannot be effectively met by supply due to technological, 
information or other constraints. This often happens in the markets for 
capital, where an economic agent cannot borrow, using future income as 
collateral, to a desired extent. Insurance is also often characterised by 
missing markets, as there are various risks that are not insurable. 
Asymmetric information entails one party having superior information 
about a market transaction relative to another. Because of this, the market 
transaction will either not take place, as the less informed party would 
be unwilling to commit to a transaction where he is at a disadvantage, 
or occur at a distorted price, as the more informed party presses the 
advantage of superior information. A typical example would be the seller 
of a product having superior information about market prices than the 
buyers. In cases of asymmetric information, the outcome of resource 
allocation by the market will be sub-optimal. 
The presence of uncertainty regarding the outcomes of a market 
transaction may likewise lead to a situation where the transaction either 
does not take place or where its price is distorted. An example of this 
can be the undertaking of a major capital investment project, where the 
returns to it are uncertain and would therefore imply a significant risk 
to the investor. In this case, it would be likely that the investment would 
not take place, resulting in an economically sub-optimal outcome. 
Another likely sub-optimal outcome of the operation of markets concerns 
the distribution of wealth and income. As the market system essentially 
entails the sale and purchase of factor inputs and products at market 
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prices, access to consumption products is typically restricted to those in 
possession of factor inputs, be they human or physical capital. In a 
situation of a socially undesirable distribution of factor inputs, an 
unacceptable pattern of the distribution of output is likely to ensue. This 
would lead to a deteriorating social fabric, ultimately damaging the 
structures upon which the market economy is based. 
Market Failure in Small States 
Each of these instances of market failure is likely to be present to a larger 
extent in small economies compared to larger and more developed ones. 
In the case of monopolies, Chand (2004) observes that the thinness or 
small size of domestic markets and the need to achieve a minimum 
efficient scale of operations, often in the context of indivisibilities of 
investment expenditure, entails that a small number of operators would 
dominate the market in a small economy. This would create monopolistic 
situations in the output markets, and could also result in monopsonistic 
markets for labour. 
The presence of externalities is likely to be greater in small economies 
compared to larger ones. Environmental externalities are likely to abound 
in the context of small land areas with multiple competing uses and a 
high density of population and economic activity, creating problems in 
a number of environmental domains such as water and waste 
management. This could especially be so within island jurisdictions, 
where the management of the typically more vulnerable coastal zones 
could be even more problematic. Likewise, the infringement of property 
rights through external effects is likely to be more pronounced within 
small jurisdictions. There is also bound to be an asymmetric effect of 
externalities within small economies in the sense that while negative 
externalities are bound to be more pronounced, the effects of positive 
ones, which would cumulate commensurately with the size of the 
population and the economy, are likely to be more limited. In this context, 
it is also worthwhile mentioning that small economies are 
disproportionately suffering from external effects at the international 
level, chiefly those arising out of climate change but also those arising 
out of unintended side effects of international trade agreements and 
arrangements between large countries, particularly where these concern 
environmental resources (Fraser and Ronneberg, 2006). 
Sluggish adjustment of markets is also likely to characterise small 
economies. This can emanate from the fact that in order to compromise 
between economies of scale and of scope, activity in small economies 
tends to specialise in a small number of unrelated activities. This would 
generate an amount ot economies ot scale in each sector, while allowing 
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a measure of diversification against risks which may hit each specific 
sector. On the other hand, this would also entail that mobility of resources 
from one sector to another would be limited, due to the marked 
differences in the nature of operations between sectors. It is neither 
easy nor quick to transform restaurant waiters into operators in hi-
tech electronics factories in the case of an adverse shock to the tourism 
industry. This is typical of economies which are structurally ingrained 
to produce a limited range of output, as indeed experienced by those 
which specialised in the production of specific agricultural products 
and which were hit by adverse international terms of trade effects. 
Sluggish market adjustment may also reflect the thinness and 
shallowness of markets in small economies, as limitations in the number 
of players and activities hinder the speed with which resources may 
be reallocated. 
The issue of missing markets, particularly in the case of capital and 
insurance, is another characterising feature of small states. Due to their 
inherent weaknesses and vulnerabilities, small states could 
disproportionately benefit from access to the global capital markets for 
financing and for insurance (Stiglitz, 1995). Yet, such markets are often 
missing, on account of the difficulties in discounting future income 
streams and in insuring risks of an unusual nature that typically afflict 
small vulnerable economies. Missing markets in small states also exist 
at a domestic level. Due to the limited economic size, small states often 
have to resort to outside sources for commodities and resources which 
may also be of a strategic nature. The reliance of many small states on 
foreign direct investment, in the absence of sufficient domestic capital 
resources, which is at times associated with sub-optimal outcomes for 
the host country (Edison et al., 2002), is a case in point. 
Information asymmetries may also characterise the operations of markets 
in small economies. This may arise out of the presence of relatively large 
market players, which could exercise monopoly rents to obtain superior 
information relative to the more numerous customers with lower 
bargaining power. This situation could also be present in the international 
trade arena, where operators from a small economy could face 
information disadvantages relative to multinational players. Moreover, 
there could be information asymmetries in official international trade 
bargaining processes, where small countries could be at a disadvantage 
in terms of expertise and hence, bargaining power (Palayathan, 2004). 
Uncertainty is an unavoidable consequence of the exposure to shocks 
which characterises small, vulnerable economies and often results in 
market failure. Exposure to shocks creates risk in the undertaking of 
investment which cannot be easily diversified away within a small 
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country context. This may result in slower development processes in 
small countries. Another consequence of uncertainty is excessive 
volatility in prices in reaction to actual or anticipated market shocks. 
This is often reflected in high exchange rate volatility for small states 
which do not opt for a managed exchange rate regime (Worrel et al., 
2006). In turn, exchange rate volatility would introduce risks to the import 
and export business on which small states are highly dependent, thereby 
distorting prices of internationally traded commodities in the upward 
direction, resulting in a loss of welfare. 
A socially undesirable distribution of income often results from market 
failure in small economies. Economic backwardness resulting in poverty 
may occur from a number of instances of market failure discussed above, 
and is indeed documented for a number of small economies (Springer, 
2006). In particular, an excessive concentration of economic activities 
may increase the social vulnerability of particular segments of society 
which, in the event of adverse shocks, would find it difficult to re-engage 
in economic activity. 
4. Policy Failure in Small Economies 
The above discussion highlights the need for government intervention 
in order to rectify market failure, especially in small, vulnerable 
economies where the incidence of market failure is, as explained above, 
relatively higher. Government intervention however may also result in 
failure. Krueger (1990) categorises instances of policy failure into two 
broad groups namely failures of commission, where government 
intervention actually worsens the economic situation, and failures of 
omission where government actually refrains from intervening when it 
should optimally do so. 
It can be argued that the chances of policy failure tend to be higher in 
small states than in larger ones. Datta-Chaudhuri (1990) argues that 
government intervention may result in unpredictable changes in 
economic conditions and in costly mistakes. This risk is especially high 
in small economies where the government sector is relatively large and 
any single intervention is bound to have widespread effects. 
Furthermore, the objectives of government policy may be obfuscated 
hf'tWf'f'n f'conomic, social and political rationales. This can be especially 
the case in small economies due to the incidence of clientelism in the 
political system, created by the proximity of social and political 
relationships and to the possible concentration of political power within 
a small group of elites. 
139 
Small States and the Pillars of Economic Resilience 
Policy intervention can also fail from the implementation perspective. This 
is often the case in small states which lack the human resources and other 
aspects of administrative capacity necessary to properly implement policy 
measures. It is also to be considered that government intervention often 
results in a costly bureaucracy, with such costs likely to be commensurately 
higher in small states due to problems of indivisibility. 
Government intervention may stifle private initiative. This can happen 
to a greater extent in small states, where there could be a major tendency 
for the economy to be dependent on government for the provision of 
income and employment. 
Better economic governance is the principal solution to the failure of policy 
failure to adequately address market failure (Carment, 2003; Holden, 2004). 
This is likely to be especially so in small states, where the incidence of 
policy failure is bound to be relatively more pronounced, at the same 
time that the need for properly functioning markets to face economic 
shocks is exacerbated. In small states, good governance is not only crucial 
in the process of development, as is the case for all economies, but also 
contributes to building resilience against exogenous shocks. Indeed, 
economic governance issues are deemed to be an important explanatory 
factor for the wide variations in the degree of economic success achieved 
by small states (Briguglio et al., 2006; Warrington, 1994). 
5. Conclusion 
It is now widely accepted in the literature that small states are 
economically vulnerable and are highly exposed to exogenous shocks 
outside their control. This has to be met by resilience building, intended 
to enable small states to withstand and counteract the effects of negative 
shocks. In turn, resilience depends on the efficiency with which resources 
are allocated and can be reallocated following the incidence of shocks. 
Markets are viewed to constitute the optimal vehicle for resource 
allocation. This chapter has shown, however, that resource allocation 
via the market mechanism is bound to meet with instances of failure, 
and this is especially so in small states. Market failures include situations 
of monopoly and monopsony, external effects and the consequences of 
uncertainty and missing markets. Policy intervention is therefore 
especially called for in small, vulnerahlf' states so as to rectify market 
failure through policies which define property rights, ensure proper 
market access and private sector development, and provide for the 
investment in public goods. These issues are considered to be critical to 
an optimal allocation of resources and to the development of resilience. 
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It is however also recognised in the literature that policy intervention in 
small states may also be fraught with failure. Such instances, which may 
arise from obfuscated objectives, mistakes in policy formulation, 
problems in policy implementation and high costs of policy intervention 
would also tend to be magnified in small vulnerable economies. This is 
due to the relatively large size of the government sector, social proximity, 
insufficient human and administrative capacity and indivisibilities in 
the costs of the public sector. It is therefore imperative for small 
vulnerable states to build resilience through appropriate policy 
interventions aimed at eliminating market failure through enhanced 
efficiency and proper governance. 
Different small states have achieved varying degrees of success in this 
respect. There is no one general model for appropriate policy intervention 
and governance, and solutions have to be devised which are appropriate 
to specific country contexts aimed at eliminating both market as well as 
policy failure. Appropriate policies for small states in this regard should 
give due importance to small economy realities including thin markets, 
indivisibilities of overhead expenditure, limited ability to achieve 
economies of scale especially in manufacturing and, in the case of islands, 
high transport costs. This suggests that small states that need to build 
their economic resilience should not take "off-the-shelf" remedies from 
larger countries but should emulate successful models pertaining to other 
small countries with similar characteristics and problems. 
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